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Abstract
In anonymous secret sharing schemes, the secret can be reconstructed without knowledge of
which participants hold which shares. In this paper, we derive a tighter lower bound on the
size of the shares than the bound of Blundo and Stinson for anonymous (k; n)-threshold schemes
with 1¡k¡n. Our bound is tight for k =2. We also show a close relationship between optimum
anonymous (2; n)-threshold secret schemes and combinatorial designs. ? 2002 Elsevier Science
B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
A (k; n)-threshold secret sharing scheme [1,7] is a method in which a dealer dis-
tributes a secret s to a set of n users in such a way that any k or more users can
recover the secret s and any k−1 or less users have no information on s. On the other
hand, in an anonymous secret sharing scheme, the secret can be reconstructed without
knowledge of which participants hold which shares. In such schemes, the computation
of the secret can be carried out by giving the shares to a black box that does not
know the identities of the participants holding those shares. This would seem to be
a desirable property in certain applications. For example, if the scheme is to be used
to provide access to a secure area, then an anonymous scheme will provide security
without the need for a separate identi<cation protocol.
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Anonymous secret sharing schemes were <rst investigated by Stinson and Vanstone
[8]. In the model proposed in [8], the participants receive distinct shares (we will call
such a scheme a “strict” anonymous scheme). The authors proved a lower bound on
the size of the shares and provided optimal schemes for certain class of threshold
structures by using a combinatorial characterization of optimal schemes.
Next, Phillips and Phillips [6] considered a diHerent model for anonymous secret
sharing schemes. In their model, diHerent participants are allowed to receive the same
shares. They analyzed ideal anonymous secret sharing schemes in which the size of the
shares given to each participant is equal to the size of the secret. The authors proved
that an ideal anonymous (k; n)-threshold scheme can be realized if and only if k =1
or n.
Recently, Blundo and Stinson [2] showed a lower bound on the size of the shares
for (k; n)-threshold schemes with 1¡k¡n together with another lower bound for an
in<nite class of access structures. They also presented constructions, some of which
use Steiner systems.
In this paper, we derive a tighter lower bound on the size of the shares than the
bound of Blundo and Stinson for anonymous (k; n)-threshold scheme with 1¡k¡n.
Our bound is tight for k =2. We also show a close relationship between optimum
anonymous (2; n)-threshold secret schemes and resolvable Steiner systems.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Notation and de8nitions
Let P= {P1; : : : ; Pn} be a set of n participants and D be a dealer. Let S be a set of
secrets and V be a set of shares. Suppose that the dealer D wants to share the secret
s∈ S among the participants in P.
We represent a secret sharing scheme by a collection of distribution rules. A distri-
bution rule is a function
f :P ∪ {D} → S ∪ V
which satis<es the conditions f(D)∈ S and f(Pi)∈V for i=1; 2; : : : ; n. A distribution
rule f represents a possible distribution of shares to participants, where f(D) is the
secret being shared, and f(Pi) is the share given to Pi. If s∈ S is the secret that D
wants to share, then D will choose a distribution rule f such that
f(D)= s
uniformly at random, and use f to distribute shares to participants.
Let {Pr(s)}s∈S be a probability distribution on S. Let F be a family of distribution
rules. We de<ne (k; n)-threshold secret sharing schemes as follows.
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Denition 2.1. A (k; n)-threshold secret sharing scheme is a collection of distribution
rules F that satisfy the following two properties:
(1) If A ⊆ P and |A|¿ k, then for all a= {(Pi; vi): Pi ∈A; vi ∈V} with Pr(a)¿0, a
unique secret s∈ S exists such that Pr(s | a)= 1.
(2) If B ⊆ P and |B|6 k−1, then for all b= {(Pi; vi): Pi ∈B; vi ∈V} with Pr(b)¿0,
and for all secrets s∈ S, it holds Pr(s | b)=Pr(s).
Denition 2.2 (Phillips and Phillips [6] and Blundo and Stinson [2]). An anonymous
(k; n)-threshold secret sharing scheme is a collection of distribution rules F which sat-
is<es property (2) of De<nition 2.1, as well as the following property:
(1′) If A ⊆ P and |A|¿ k, then for all v= [vi: Pi ∈A; vi ∈V ] with Pr(v)¿0, a unique
secret s∈ S exists such that Pr(s | v)= 1.
Finally, we will use braces { } to denote sets and square brackets [ ] to denote
multisets (a multiset is a set containing repeated elements).
2.2. Known results
Phillips and Phillips showed the following proposition [6].
Proposition 2.1. There exists an anonymous (k; n)-threshold scheme such that |V |= |S|
if and only if k =1 or n.
Therefore, |V |¿|S| if 1¡k¡n from [4,5]. Blundo and Stinson showed a lower
bound on |V | for 1¡k¡n as follows [2].
Proposition 2.2. In any anonymous (k; n)-threshold schemes with 1¡k¡n;
|V |¿
[
(n− k + 2) |S| − 1|S| − 1
]
(|S| − 1):
3. Tighter lower bound on |V |
In this section, we derive a tighter lower bound on |V | than Proposition 2.2 for
anonymous (k; n)-threshold schemes. Let
S = {1; 2; : : : ; |S|}:
For each f∈F, de<ne
Bf , [f(Pj): k − 16 j6 n];
where Bf is a multiset. We call Bf a block.
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Fix a distribution rule f0 ∈F arbitrarily and de<ne
Fi , {f∈F: f(D)= i; f(Pj)=f0(Pj) for 16 j6 k − 2};
Ai , [Bf: f∈Fi];
A0 ,A1 ∪A2 ∪ · · · ∪A|S|:
Suppose that x∈V occurs cfx times in Bf. Let
cix ,
∑
f∈Fi
cfx :
Then Blundo and Stinson showed the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1 (Blundo and Stinson [2, p. 20]). In any anonymous (k; n)-threshold se-
cret sharing scheme with 1¡k¡n:
(1) There exists a constant cx such that
cix = cx
for any i∈ S.
(2) If [x; y] occurs in some block Bf such that f(D)= i; then [x; y] occurs in no
block Bf′ such that f′(D) 
= i.
3.1. Our lower bound
Now we present our lower bound. Let
c, max
x∈V
cx:
Theorem 3.1. In any anonymous (k; n)-threshold secret sharing scheme with 1¡k¡n;
|V |¿ (|S| − 1)(n− k + 1) + 1:
Proof. Choose x0 ∈V such that
cx0 = c
arbitrarily. Then there are two cases.
Case 1: [x0; x0] appears in some block Bf1 . Suppose that f1(D)= s. That is, Bf1 ∈As.
From Proposition 3.1(2), [x0; x0] appears in no block of any Aj with j 
= s. On the
other hand, from Proposition 3.1(1), x0 occurs in exactly c blocks of Aj. Now for
j 
= s, let
Dj , {Bf|x0 ∈ Bf; Bf ∈ Aj}:
Then we have |Dj| = c. De<ne Mj be the c×(n−k+2) matrix such that each Bf ∈ Dj
is a row of Mj. Let
Yj , {y|y ∈ Mj; y 
= x0}:
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Note that each y ∈ Yj appears in Mj at most cy times, where cy 6 c. Count the
elements (other than x0) of Mj in two ways. Then
c(n− k + 1)6
∑
y∈Yj
cy 6
∑
y∈Yj
c = c|Yj|: (1)
Hence
|Yj|¿ n− k + 1: (2)
Next for any j1 
= j2,
Yj1 ∩ Yj2 = ∅
from Proposition 3.1(2). Consequently,
|V |¿ |{x0}|+
∑
j =s
|Yj| (3)
¿ 1 + (|S| − 1)(n− k + 1): (4)
Case 2: [x0; x0] occurs in no blocks. Then similarly to Case 1, we have
|Yj|¿ n− k + 1
for any j ∈ S. Therefore,
|V |¿ |{x0}|+
∑
j
|Yj|
¿ |S|(n− k + 1) + 1
¿ (|S| − 1)(n− k + 1) + 1:
It is easy to see that this bound is tighter than Proposition 2.2.
3.2. Generalization
A quali<ed subset of P which can recover the secret is called an access set, and
the family of all access sets is called the access structure, denoted by .
Denition 3.1 (Phillips and Phillips [6] and Blundo and Stinson [2]). An anonymous
secret sharing scheme for  is a collection of distribution rules which satisfy the fol-
lowing two properties:
(1) If A∈, then for all v= [vi: Pi ∈A; vi ∈V ] with Pr(v)¿0, a unique secret s∈ S
exists such that Pr(s | v)= 1.
(2) If B 
∈ , then for all b= {(Pi; vi): Pi ∈B; vi ∈V} with Pr(b)¿0, and for all
secrets s∈ S, it holds Pr(s | b)=Pr(s).
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Blundo and Stinson showed the following lower bound on |V | by generalizing the
proof of Proposition 2.2.
Denition 3.2. We say that B ⊆ P is a semi-maximal nonaccess set if B ∪ {Pi} 
∈ 
for all Pi ∈P \ B and B ∪ {Pi; Pj}∈ for all {Pi; Pj} ⊆ P \ B.
Proposition 3.2 (Blundo and Stinson [2]). Suppose that there exists a semi-maximal
nonaccess set B ⊆ P in an anonymous secret sharing scheme for . Then
|V |¿
[
(n− |B|) |S| − 1|S| − 1
]
(|S| − 1):
Let 0 = {{P1; P3; P4}; {P2; P4}; {P1; P2}} be the minimal quali<ed set of an ac-
cess structure on the set of participants P= {P1; P2; P3; P4}. In this case, we can take
B= {P3}.
Corollary 3.1 (Blundo and Stinson [2]). In any anonymous secret sharing scheme for
0;
|V |¿2|S| − 5 + 3|S| :
On the other hand, by generalizing the proof of Theorem 3.1, we can obtain the
following lower bounds.
Theorem 3.2. Suppose that there exists a semi-maximal nonaccess set B ⊆ P in an
anonymous secret sharing scheme for . Then
|V |¿ (n− |B| − 1)(|S| − 1) + 1:
Corollary 3.2. In any anonymous secret sharing scheme for 0;
|V |¿ 2|S| − 1:
It is clear that our bounds are tighter than Proposition 3.2 and Corollary 3.1.
4. Relationship with combinatorial designs
4.1. Steiner systems
We now present some basic terminology from design theory. A k-(v; n; ) design is
a pair (V;B), where V is a set of v elements and B is a family of subsets of V of
size n (called blocks), such that every subset of elements of size k appears in exactly
 blocks. A k-(v; n; ) design is said to be nontrivial if k¡n¡v. A Steiner system is
a k-(v; n; 1) design, also denoted by S(k; n; v). Let (V;B) be a Steiner system. We say
that (V;B) is partitionable if we can partition the set of blocks B into sets B1; : : : ;B‘
in such a way that each (V;Bj), for 16 j6 ‘, is a Steiner system S(k − 1; n; v).
If a Steiner system is partitionable, then the integer ‘=(v − k + 1)=(n − k + 1). A
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partitionable S(2; n; v) is called resolvable. For general information on the existence of
k-(v; n; ) designs, we refer to [3].
Blundo and Stinson showed the following proposition [2].
Proposition 4.1. If there exists a resolvable Steiner system S(2; n; |V |); then there
exists an anonymous (2; n)-threshold scheme with |V |=(|S| − 1)(n− 1) + 1.
4.2. Relationship between optimum schemes and Steiner systems
We say that an anonymous (k; n)-threshold secret sharing scheme is optimum if the
equality of Theorem 3.1 is satis<ed. Then we obtain the following theorem immediately
from Proposition 4.1.
Theorem 4.1. There exists an optimum anonymous (2; n)-threshold secret sharing
scheme if there exists a resolvable Steiner system S(2; n; |V |).
This theorem implies that Theorem 3.1 is tight for k =2.
We next prove a weak converse of Theorem 4.1. That is, we prove that there exists
a Steiner system S(2; n; |V |) (not necessarily resolvable) if there exists an optimum
anonymous (2; n)-threshold secret sharing scheme.
In what follows, suppose that there exists an optimum anonymous (k; n)-threshold
secret sharing scheme. Then the following lemmas hold from the proof of Theorem
3.1. (We use the same notation as in the proof of Theorem 3.1.)
Lemma 4.1. Case 2 does not occur and all the equalities of Case 1 are satis8ed.
Proof. From the proof of Theorem 3.1.
Lemma 4.2. Each block Bf = [bk−1; bk ; : : : ; bn] ∈A0 must satisfy either
bk−1 = bk = · · · = bn
or
bi 
= bj for any i 
= j:
Proof. Note that
cx = c
for any x ∈ V from the equality of Eq. (1). Therefore, the proof of Case 1 holds for
any x0 ∈ V .
Suppose that some [x0; x0] appears in Bf ∈A0. Then from the equality of Eq. (4),
we must have
Bf = [x0; x0; : : : ; x0]:
Lemma 4.3. If B ∈ Dj, then all the elements of B are distinct.
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Proof. From the de<nition of Dj; [x0; x0] does not appear in any B ∈ Dj. Therefore,
B contains {x0; y} such that y 
= x0. Then form Lemma 4.2, all the elements of B are
distinct.
Now for each j with j 
= s, choose one block B˜j ∈ Dj arbitrarily. Let
B, {B˜j|j 
= s}:
We will prove that (B; V ) is a Steiner system S(2; n; |V |) for k = 2.
Lemma 4.4. Any B ∈ Dj is a permutation of B˜j
Proof. From Lemma 4.3 and the equality of Eq. (2).
Lemma 4.5. Any two distinct elements {x0; y} appear in at least one block of B.
Proof. From the equality of Eq. (3), any {x0; y} appears in some block B′ ∈ Dj with
j 
= s.
On the other hand, from Lemma 4.4, any B′ ∈ Dj is a permutation of B˜j. Therefore,
{x0; y} is included in B˜j. Hence, {x0; y} appears in some block of B.
Proof. Note that
|Bf| = n− k + 2 = n
if k = 2. First, suppose that some two distinct elements {x0; y} appear in two or more
blocks of B. These blocks must belong to the same Ah because {x0; y} determines
the secret h uniquely (k = 2). However, we choose one block from Ah to construct
B. This is a contradiction.
Then from Lemma 4.5, any two distinct elements appear in exactly one block of B.
Therefore, (B; V ) is a Steiner system S(2; n; |V |).
5. Impossibility for k¿ 3
In this section, we show that the equality of Theorem 3.1 cannot be satis<ed for
36 k¡n.
Denition 5.1. We say that {P1; · · · ; Pk−2} is a base set of the participants.
Theorem 5.1. In any anonymous (k; n)-threshold secret sharing scheme with 36 k¡n;
|V |¿(|S| − 1)(n− k + 1) + 1:
Proof. Suppose that there exists an anonymous (k; n)-threshold scheme for some
36 k¡n.
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P1 is included in the base set (see De<nition 5.1) since k − 2¿ 1. For f0 in the
de<nition of Fi, let y=f0(P1).
From Lemma 4.3 and Lemma 4.5, there exists a Bf1 ∈ A0 such that y appears in
Bf1 and all the elements of Bf1 are distinct. Without loss of generality, we can suppose
that f1(Pn)=y. Then we have that
f0(P1)=f1(P1)=f1(Pn)=y; (6)
f1(Pn−1) 
=f1(Pn): (7)
Next, let {P2; : : : ; Pk−1} be a base set of the participants and de<ne
F′i , {f∈F: f(D)= i; f(Pj)=f1(Pj) for 26 j6 k − 1};
B′f , [f(Pj): j=1; k; k + 1; : : : ; n];
A′i , [Bf: f∈F′i];
A′0 ,A
′
1 ∪ · · · ∪A′|S|:
Then [y; y] appears in B′f1 ∈A′0 from Eq. (5). Therefore, from Lemma 4.2, it must be
that
B′f1 = [y; : : : ; y]:
However, this contradicts Eq. (6).
By generalizing the proof of Theorem 5.1, we can strengthen Theorem 3.2 as follows.
Theorem 5.2. Suppose that there exist two semi-maximal nonaccess sets B1 and B2
such that |B1|= |B2|=m and |P \ (B1 ∪ B2)|¿ 2 in an anonymous secret sharing
scheme for . Then
|V |¿(n− m− 1)(|S| − 1) + 1:
Let 1 = {{P1; P2; P3}; {P1; P2; P4}; {P1; P2; P5}; {P3; P4}; {P3; P5}; {P4; P5}} be the
minimal quali<ed set of an access structure on the set of participants P=
{P1; P2; P3; P4; P5}. In this case, we can take B1 = {P1} and B2 = {P2}. Note that
|P \ (B1 ∪ B2)|= |{P3; P4; P5}|¿ 2:
Corollary 5.1. In any anonymous secret sharing scheme for 1;
|V |¿3|S| − 2:
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